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References  21The post-lehman phase of the financial crisis has exposed a number of weaknesses in the banking sectors of the european 
Union’s New Member States (NMSs). one of these is the prevalence of lending in foreign currency. While banks themselves 
in these countries have not taken on sizeable currency risk directly, they passed it on to households and the corporate 
sector. With large depreciations taking place or looming in the region, the currency risk at households and corporates 
without a natural hedge is now being transformed into credit risk for the banking sector. This is creating a serious problem 
in  maintaining  financial  stability  and  cripples  monetary  policy  in  countries  where  it  operates  primarily  through  the 
exchange rate channel. 
The patterns of foreign currency lending to households in NMSs vary widely both across countries and time periods. For 
example, FX lending to households is virtually non-existent in the czech republic while in some Baltic countries its share 
is close to 100 per cent of total household lending. The main goal of the paper is (1) to present the stylised facts of pre-crisis 
FX lending in NMSs systematically and (2) to try to explain these differing patterns in an econometric model. in order to 
do  so,  a  panel  database  of  household  FX  borrowing  is  compiled,  covering  10  NMSs  in  the  period  1999-2008.  our 
estimation  results  suggest  that  the  degree  of  household  FX  borrowing  depends  on  the  interest  rate  differential,  the 
institutional features of mortgage financing and the monetary regime. Household FX borrowing tends to be less prevalent 
if the interest rate differential is small, fixed interest rate mortgage financing is available and the monetary authority’s “fear 
of floating” is low. 
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Abstract
A pénzügyi válság lehman-csőd utáni fázisa az új eU-tagországok bankrendszereinek több gyengeségét is felszínre hozta.   
Az egyik ilyen gyakori gyengeség a kiterjedt devizahitelezés. A devizahitelezésben érintett országok bankjai közvetlen árfo-
lyamkockázatot nem vállaltak magukra, ezt továbbhárították lakossági és vállalati ügyfeleikre. A válság során több országban 
nagymértékű leértékelődés zajlott le vagy megnőtt egy ilyen leértékelődés valószínűsége, s így a természetes fedezettel nem 
rendelkező lakossági és vállalati ügyfelek árfolyamkockázata a bankok számára is megjelenő hitelkockázattá alakult át. ez a 
pénzügyi stabilitás fenntartásában komoly problémát okoz és a monetáris politikát is korlátozza azokban az országokban 
ahol ez utóbbi elsősorban az árfolyamcsatornán keresztül képes hatni a gazdaságra.
A háztartásoknak nyújtott devizahitelek elterjedtsége az új eU-tagországok csoportján belül nagyon eltérő mintát mutat 
mind keresztmetszetben, mind időben. csehországban például gyakorlatilag nem volt lakossági devizahitelezés, míg egyes 
balti országokban a devizahitelek részaránya a teljes lakossági hitelezésen belül a 100 százalékot közelítette. Tanulmányunk 
fő célja, hogy (1) az új eU-tagországokban  a pénzügyi válságot megelőzően tapasztalt lakossági devizahitelezéssel kapcso-
latos stilizált tényeket szisztematikusan feltárja, és (2) az eltérő mintákat ökonometriai módszerekkel magyarázni próbálja. 
ebből a célból egy panel adatbázist állítottunk fel, amely 10 új eU-tagországot és az 1999–2008-as időszakot fedi le. 
Becslési eredményeink szerint a lakossági devizahitelek elterjedtségét befolyásolhatta a kamatkülönbözet, a monetáris 
rezsim milyensége és a jelzáloghitelezés egyes intézményi vonásai. A lakossági devizahitelezés mértékét csökkentette, ha a 
kamatkülönbözet mérsékelt volt, ha a monetáris hatóság magatartására kevéssé volt jellemző az árfolyam-volatilitástól való 
ódzkodás („fear of floating”) és ha a háztartások számára fix kamatozású jelzáloghitelek is elérhetőek voltak.
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The post-lehman phase of the financial crisis has exposed a number of weaknesses in the banking sectors of New Member 
States (NMSs). one of these is the prevalence of lending in foreign currency. While banks themselves in these countries 
have not taken on sizeable currency risk directly, they passed it on to households and the corporate sector. With large 
depreciations taking place or looming in the region, the currency risk at households and corporates without a natural hedge 
is now being transformed into credit risk for the banking sector. This is creating a serious problem in maintaining financial 
stability and cripples monetary policy in countries where it operates primarily through the exchange rate channel. 
The patterns of foreign currency lending to households in NMSs vary widely both across countries and time periods. For 
example, FX lending to households is virtually non-existent in the czech republic while in the Baltics its share is close to 
100 per cent of total household lending. There are only a few empirical papers that tried to explain this wide variety in 
NMSs.
Basso et al. (2007) develop a model to explain the determinants of financial dollarisation in transition economies. The main 
predictions of their model are that 1) foreign funding availability induces liability dollarisation, 2) interest rate differentials 
matter both in loan and deposit dollarisation, hence UiP does not necessarily hold, 3) the trade-off between inflation and 
real exchange rate volatility plays a significant role as well, 4) openness matters. Their theoretical results are underpinned 
by a panel model estimation for which an impressive database of 24 transition countries’ monthly data is used. The 
dependent variable is the share of FX-loans in total outstanding loans and, in an alternative specification the changes in 
this share. They note that the interest rate differential has almost no impact on the level of financial dollarisation while it 
affects the change in dollarisation significantly. They note that the explanatory power of their model is generally lower for 
households than for corporates and call for more research in this area.
in a recent empirical paper, Rosenberg and Tirpák (2008) investigate foreign currency borrowing by the private sector in 
NMSs. They estimate a quarterly panel model in which they explain the share of FX loans in total domestic bank loans to 
the non-financial private sector. They find that the interest rate differential and the availability of foreign funding are of 
primary importance in explaining liability dollarisation in NMSs. They also find some evidence of regulatory policies 
aimed at curbing FX lending being effective at least in the case of borrowing from domestic banks. However, this effect is 
more limited if direct borrowing from foreign banks is taken into account as well. 
A related paper is Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2010), which uses a vector-autoregression framework to assess the substitution 
between domestic and foreign currency borrowing in the face of a domestic monetary policy shock. Using data for the 
czech republic, Hungary and Poland, they find that there is a significant substitution effect from domestic to foreign 
currency borrowing after a monetary policy shock (an increase in the interest rate differential). They argue that the 
widespread availability of FX borrowing limits the effectiveness of monetary policy through this substitution effect.
Unhedged foreign currency borrowing by households in the eU is not unique to NMSs and is particularly widespread in 
Austria. indeed, Beer, Ongena and Peter (2010) describe Austrian households as ‘carry traders’, taking advantage of the 
lower interest rates on Swiss franc housing loans and the limited euro/franc volatility giving rise to the perception of a 
quasi-fixed exchange rate. 
Most of these studies use stock data on FX loans (FX shares in the stock or sometimes changes in this FX share) which 
may change very slowly even if there are fundamental changes in households’ borrowing preferences. The corresponding 
flow measure, that is, the share of foreign currency lending in total new lending is a much more prompt indicator of 
borrowers’ behavioural changes, but rarely available. one of the contributions of our paper is that we try to proxy this flow 
measure by the share of the change in FX debt to the change in total debt.
We also add to the existing literature by emphasising an important institutional feature of bank lending, that is, the 
availability of long-term fixed interest rate domestic currency loans. We argue that if only variable rate loans are available, 
a monetary regime that exhibits “fear of floating” smoothing the exchange rate actively by interest rate policy may create 
1	IntroductionMAGYAr NeMZeTi BANK
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an additional incentive to borrow in foreign currency. Since a key determinant for the availability of long-term fixed 
interest rate domestic currency loans is the availability of long-term domestic funding for the banking sector, in the 
empirical part we proxy this with existence of a sizeable local covered bond market.
We  present  a  brief  discussion  on  how  households’  liquidity  constraints  may  magnify  the  effects  of  the  interest  rate 
differential, “fear of floating” and the prevalence of variable rate lending on the choice between FX and home currency 
lending.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 presents the stylised facts of household FX borrowing in NMSs 
focusing on both the cross-sectional and the time dimensions. in Section 3 we present a simple framework for analysing 
household borrowing decisions, based on relative risk-adjusted returns. We show the implications of variable rate lending 
in this framework. Section 4 briefly discusses the panel dataset of household FX borrowing that we compiled for ten NMSs, 
our estimation methodology and the results. Finally, the last Section concludes and provides some policy implications.MNB occASioNAl PAPerS 87. • 2010 7
Financial intermediation in the new eU member states (NMSs) in general has increased in the past decade. This is not 
surprising,  given  the  initial  gap  in  bank  credit-to-GDP  ratios  in  NMSs  compared  to  europe  and  the  dynamic  real 
convergence that these countries exhibited. However, the increase in bank credit-to-GDP ratios was not gradual, it seems 
to have gathered more momentum in 2003–2004. This may have been related to the fact that eight of these countries gained 
eU-membership in 2004 (Bulgaria and romania joined in 2007). Membership of the eU may have been associated with 
expectations of a faster future income catching-up in these countries. Such a change in expectations may have increased 
both credit demand and supply. The other reason for credit growth speeding up after 2003–2004 may have been that global 
liquidity had become increasingly abundant and cheap in this period.
Much of this increase in bank credit-to-GDP ratios was attributable to a steady increase in household borrowing. Starting 
from very modest levels in 1997, household bank credit relative to GDP grew five to six times larger by 2007. Although the 
increase was more gradual than that of total credit, household credit growth seems to have picked up somewhat starting 
in 2003–2004 as well. 
The prevalence of foreign currency borrowing by households shows differing patterns in NMSs. At one extreme are the 
two Baltic states of estonia and latvia with very high, 80-90% FX shares in household debt. Household indebtedness is 
also notably higher in these two countries than in the rest of the region. At the other extreme are the czech republic and 
Slovakia, where household FX borrowing is virtually non-existent. The rest of the NMSs are somewhere in between, with 
lithuania, Hungary and romania having FX shares larger than 50 per cent of total household debt, while Poland and 
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Total credit/GDP Household credit/GDP
Chart	1
Bank	credit-to-GDP,	average	of	selected	NMSs*
* Unweighted average of NMS for which data was available for the whole 1997–2008 period (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Poland). 
Source: central banks.MAGYAr NeMZeTi BANK
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However, the share of foreign currency debt in total debt is only a lagging indicator of changes in households’ choice 
between FX and domestic currency debt. A measure that would promptly reflect behavioural changes is the share of new 
FX borrowing in total new borrowing. This measure always takes a value between 0 and 1 and can be thought of as the 
conditional probability at a given point in time of a household choosing a foreign currency loan as opposed to a domestic 
currency loan if it wants to borrow. Such a measure is unfortunately not available across countries. However, it can be 



















Just like the share of foreign currency borrowing in total new borrowing, FXt will generally be between 0 and 1. This is 
not always the case though: if domestic currency debt drops in absolute terms because redemptions are larger than new 
borrowing while foreign currency debt increases, then FXt will be larger than 1. Similarly, if foreign currency debt drops 
while domestic currency debt increases, FXt will be smaller than zero.1 
even with these limitations, FXt is a good proxy for households’ preference for foreign currency vis-à-vis domestic currency 
borrowing, as it is able to capture behavioural changes much sooner than the foreign currency share of the debt stock.
FXt in NMSs varies considerably, both across countries and in time as well. To illustrate changes along the time dimension 
as well, we broke our sample in two periods: before and after 2003, that is, before and after the speeding up of credit 
growth in NMSs. 
The first observation is that in NMSs households’ willingness to borrow in foreign currency on average was high in the 
past decade. looking at the cross-sectional differences, the two Baltic states of estonia and latvia (both operating currency 
boards) again stand out with very high FXt in both periods, while households in the czech republic and Slovakia does not 






















































































Per cent of GDP
Chart	2
Household	bank	credit/GDP,	September	2008
Source: central banks.MNB occASioNAl PAPerS 87. • 2010 9
STYliSeD FAcTS oF HoUSeHolD FX BorroWiNG iN NeW eU MeMBer STATeS
foreign currency loans only in the second period. in contrast to the developments in the other three currency board 
regimes, FXt in Bulgaria, the fourth currency board regime in the NMS group, remained relatively low in both periods. 
currency boards are by far not alone in exhibiting households’ high willingness to borrow in foreign currency, with Poland 
in the first period and Hungary and romania in the second showing comparably high FXt figures.
looking at the time dimension, FXt on average increased considerably, from 0.34 in the slow credit growth period to 0.51 
in the fast credit growth period. The sharp increase in Hungary stands out: from one of the lowest levels of FXt in the 
earlier period, households seem to have taken a complete U-turn to almost exclusively borrowing in foreign currency. The 
increase in FXt in NMSs was not universal though. in a completely opposite fashion to what had happened in Hungary, 
households in Poland switched from an earlier very strong willingness to borrow in foreign currency to a somewhat more 
modest preference of FX loans by the second period.
To sum up the stylised facts, although households’ foreign currency borrowing is widespread in NMSs and its importance 
has generally increased over time, there are large differences between individual countries. in the following sections we try 
to explain these differences from the credit demand side, predominantly with the different de facto monetary and exchange 
rate regimes in place in NMSs. These are as manifold as the observed differences in foreign currency borrowing, ranging 
from currency boards through exchange rate bands to free floats combined with inflation targeting. The monetary regimes 
have a fundamental effect on the relative risk-return profiles of domestic vs. foreign currency borrowing for households. 
We will argue that liquidity constraints and certain structural features of financial intermediation (e.g. the lack of long-
term domestic currency funding and the resulting prevalence of variable-rate loans) may magnify the effects of monetary 
regimes. 
We do not examine the credit supply side directly. At first glance, differences in the availability of foreign currency loans 
across the region may not be significant as the banking sector of almost all of the NMSs is predominantly owned by the 
same large Western european banking groups. While we note that regulation and government subsidies for certain types 
of loans may be another source of differences between FX-borrowing patterns in NMSs, due to lack of comparable data, 
we do not include these in our analysis. Rosenberg and Tirpák (2008) constructed an FX lending regulation index and found 































































































































Source: authors’ calculation based on data from central banksMNB occASioNAl PAPerS 87. • 2010 10
in this section we build a simple framework for analysing households’ choice between home and foreign currency loans, 
based on relative risk-return profiles. This simple framework will demonstrate that the availability of fixed versus variable 
interest rate loans may be an important factor influencing households’ decision.
The main idea is that borrowers compare risk-adjusted returns when choosing between home and foreign currency loans. 
We assume that it is sufficient to compare nominal returns since, when calculating real returns, domestic borrowers deflate 
both FX and home currency loan returns with the same expected domestic inflation. 
if fixed interest rate loans are available, the expected return in time t on a home currency loan maturing in T is  T t i , − , 
that is, the negative of the home currency interest rate with a T-t year maturity. The expected return on a foreign currency 
loan with the same maturity is  ( ) T t t T t s E i ,
*
, D + − , where 
*














1  is the expected average annual depreciation of the home currency until the loan’s maturity.
The difference between expected returns is an important determinant of households’ choice between home and foreign 
currency loans. if households are risk averse, they will also care about the relative variance of these returns.2 We construct 
a simple measure of risk-adjusted returns (RARs) for home and foreign currency loans by subtracting variance from the 
expected return.3
With fixed interest rates, the home currency loan is riskless, therefore its risk-adjusted return is simply the negative of the 
domestic currency interest rate:
   
T t
home
fixed i RAR ,
  − =  (1)
The return on the FX loan depends not just on the foreign interest rate (which is fixed and therefore riskless) but on 
currency depreciation as well, which is a random variable. The risk adjusted return on the foreign currency loan will be:
    ( ) s s E i RAR t T t t T t
FX
fixed ∆ − ∆ + − = var ,
*
, λ ,  (2)
where vartDs is the conditional variance of annual currency depreciation given information at time t and l>0 is a constant 
measuring the degree of households’ risk aversion. 
Households will compare risk-adjusted returns when choosing between home and foreign currency loans. To express the 
risk-return advantage of FX loans, we construct a relative risk-adjusted return (rrAr) by simply subtracting (1) from (2):




fixed fixed ∆ − ∆ − − = − = var ,
*
, , λ  .    (3)
The larger RRARfixed is, the more advantageous the risk-return profile of FX loans and the more willing households are to 
borrow in foreign currency as opposed to borrowing in domestic currency. According to (3), households care about the 
interest rate differential, expected depreciation and the perceived exchange rate risk when deciding between the two types 
of  loans.  This  implies  that,  beside  the  interest  rate  differential,  the  exchange  rate  regime  in  place  is  an  important 
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HoUSeHolDS’ DeMAND For ForeiGN cUrreNcY loANS
one can argue that in equilibrium the interest rate differential should be such that it exactly compensates for expected 
depreciation and exchange rate risk. in another words, a risk-premium adjusted UiP holds. in this case, households would 
be indifferent between FX and domestic currency loans. Note however, that even if risk-adjusted UiP holds for money 
market rates, (3) may depart from it for a number of reasons. in particular, the interest rates in (3) are bank lending rates, 
i.e. they contain certain margins above money market rates. These margins are not necessarily uniform for domestic and 
FX lending rates. in the NMS setting for example, given that the banks operating in this region are subsidiaries of Western 
european parent banks, margins on foreign currency rates may be lower than those on domestic currency rates due to 
easier access to FX funding, as shown in Basso et al. (2007). The margin policies of banks may also divert (3) from interest 
parity if banks are more averse to exchange rate risk (have a higher l) than households.
Analysing the factors on the credit supply side which may divert (3) from risk-adjusted UiP is beyond the scope of our paper. 
We just allow for the existence of this diversion and focus on the credit demand side.
let us now turn to the case of variable interest rate loans. This is a relevant extension as fixed interest rates, especially on 
long-term loans like mortgages are not always available.
With variable interest rates, not only depreciation but the (home and foreign) interest rates are random variables as well. 
Their expected value is the average of expected future short-term rates over the lifetime of  the  loan and they have 
























+ .  (4)
Assuming that the expectations hypothesis of the term structure (eHT) holds, the average of expected future short-term 

















           
  (5)
where it+j is the short (one-period) interest rate in time t+j.
combining (4) and (5), the risk-adjusted return on the home currency loan is:
  i i RAR t T t
home
variable var , λ − − =  .            (6)
The only difference of (6) from the fixed interest case (1) is that now the return has to be adjusted for interest rate risk. 
Assuming that the eHT holds for foreign interest rates as well, the risk-adjusted return on the foreign currency variable-rate 
loan is:




, , cov 2 var var i s i s s E i RAR t t t T t t T t
FX
variable ∆ + + ∆ − ∆ + − = λ .  (7)
Note  that  beside  exchange  rate  risk,  now  interest  rate  risk  enters  the  risk-adjusted  return  as  well  as  the  conditional 
covariance between currency depreciation and the foreign interest rate.
We can again express the risk-return advantage of FX-loans in the form of a relative risk-adjusted return by subtracting (6) 
from (7). After some rearranging, this gives:
( ) ( ) ( ) T t t t t t t T t T t variable s E i s i s i i i RRAR ,
* * *
, , , cov 2 var var var D − D + − D − + − = l l  (8) 
The higher RRARvariable, the more households prefer borrowing in foreign currency to borrowing in home currency. Just 
like in the fixed interest rate case, the interest rate differential and the expected depreciation are important determinants 
of households’ choice. With variable interest rates we have a richer representation of the domestic monetary regime: now MAGYAr NeMZeTi BANK
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it is not only the exchange rate variance what matters but the relative variance of domestic short-term interest rates and the 
exchange rate, captured by the third term on the right-hand side of (8). This term, varti – vartDs, is an expression of 
perceived “fear of floating”, reflecting how aggressively monetary policy is used on average to smooth exchange rate 
fluctuations. in spirit is similar to the “fear of floating” concept introduced by Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Hausmann, 
Panizza and Stein (2001). if monetary policy’s “fear of floating” perceived by households is strong, it would make foreign 
currency loans relatively attractive in two ways. First, it would reduce exchange rate risk and secondly, it would increase 
domestic interest rate risk, making home currency variable-rate loans more risky.
The variance of the foreign short rate and its covariance with the home currency’s depreciation reduce the incentive to 
borrow in foreign currency. For the empirical part of our paper we will assume away the variance in i* and, consequently, 
its covariance with depreciation. The main reason for this is that, in the period we investigate (prior to the post-lehman 
phase of the financial crisis), euro area short-term interest rates changed little, especially compared to short-term rates in 
NMSs. However, we note that the crisis may have changed the importance of this term profoundly. recall that the foreign 
currency interest rate here is not the money market rate but a bank lending rate. After the crisis, the internal transfer price 
of FX funds within cross-border banks started to reflect country risk. This means that risk premium shocks suddenly 
started to have an effect on the interest rate on FX loans. Moreover, as these risk premium shocks tended to coincide with 
currency depreciation, households may have also learned that sizeable increases in the interest rate of FX loans and 
depreciation hit them hard at the same time. This experience means that, at least after the crisis, the conditional covariance 
term may have become something far from negligible, making future borrowing in FX less attractive.
in order to examine whether the availability of fixed interest loans makes a difference to the relative attractiveness of 
foreign currency loans, we can compare the relative risk-adjusted returns under the two regimes. This can be done by 
subtracting (3) from (8):
( ) ( )
* * , cov 2 var var i s i i RRAR RRAR t t t fixed variable D − − = − l   (9)
 Assuming again that foreign currency lending rates are not correlated with depreciation, (10) suggests that a variable rate 
loan regime is more conducive to FX borrowing than fixed interest rate loans as long as domestic interest rates are more 
volatile than foreign interest rates. Since this is indeed the case in most emerging NMSs, one can conclude that the 
availability of fixed interest rate loans may reduce the relative attractiveness of foreign currency loans.
Summarising the key insights from the above analysis, we can say that households’ willingness to borrow in foreign 
currency will be positively affected by the interest rate differential and the perceived “fear of floating” of the domestic 
monetary regime. Structural features of the loan market may be important as well. in particular, the availability of fixed 
interest rate loans may reduce the effect of the “fear of floating” and the incentive to borrow in foreign currency. 
THE	RolE	oF	lIqUIDITy	CoNSTRAINTS
By liquidity constraints we mean households’ inability to pay more than a certain share of their disposable income to 
service their debt. This may stem from the lack of sufficient financial wealth or suitable collateral, which makes it difficult 
to take additional loans when debt service on the original loan increases and hits a certain threshold. This makes the size 
of the monthly repayment and its variance crucial factors for liquidity constrained households in the choice between 
different loans.
if the interest rate on the foreign currency loan is lower than that of the home currency loan, this would result in a smaller 
initial monthly repayment, or a larger loan size given the same amount of monthly repayment. The longer the maturity of 
the loan, the larger the effect of the interest rate differential on monthly repayment/loan size. liquidity constrained 
households in this case will tend to favour foreign currency loans, especially if they take long-term (e.g. mortgage) loans. 
Note that this motive is slightly different from the one associated with risk-adjusted relative return. 
liquidity constraints also magnify the importance of domestic interest rate volatility (“fear of floating”) and of the lack of 
fixed interest rate loans. it can be shown that, for a given loan size, monthly repayment is more sensitive to changes in the 
interest rate than to changes in the exchange rate. MNB occASioNAl PAPerS 87. • 2010 13
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in the numerical example illustrated in chart 4, a one percentage point increase in the interest rate on 15-year FX loan 
with an initial interest rate of 4 percent, increases the monthly repayment with roughly the same amount as a seven per 
cent depreciation. if the “fear of floating” behaviour of monetary policy is strong (and fixed-rate loans are not available), 
the resulting variance in the domestic interest rate will have a magnified effect on the monthly repayment on home 
currency loans. Households will be more likely to hit their liquidity constraint and, as a result, the home currency loan will 
be less attractive. 
in summary, the existence of liquidity constraints makes the effect of the interest rate differential, “fear of floating” and 










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
interest rate i; depreciation ds (per cent)
monthly repayment (currency units)
Monthly repayment at interest rate i
Monthly repayment after depreciation ds (at 4% interest rate)
Monthly repayment after depreciation ds (at 10% interest rate)
Chart	4
The	sensitivity	of	monthly	repayment	to	the	interest	rate	and	exchange	rate*
* Authors’ calculation, assuming a 15-year loan of the amount of 1 million currency units.MNB occASioNAl PAPerS 87. • 2010 14
DATA	DESCRIPTIoN
We compiled a panel dataset including 10 NMSs (Bulgaria, the czech republic, estonia, Hungary, latvia, lithuania, 
Poland, romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia). The sample contains annual data running from 1999 to 2008. We excluded the 
post-lehman period from our sample, hence the 2008 annual data are actually 2008 Q3 data. The panel is unbalanced, 
because in case of a few countries, some data were unavailable. 
our dependent variable, FXt is a proxy for the share of new foreign currency borrowing in the total new household 
borrowing for each year. To construct it, credit flows are proxied by the difference of end-of-year stocks, as described in 
Section 2. Data to construct FXt were gathered from central banks. FX credit stock data were available in local currencies, 
therefore we corrected for exchange rate changes, as we did not want to capture the repricing effect on the outstanding 
loans.
our explanatory variables capture the main components of our analytical framework described in Section 3. For the long-
term interest rate differential, it,T–i* t,T , we used the “lending rate” variable from the iMF’s iFS database.4 This is not a 
perfect measure of the interest rate differential households might base their decisions upon, because 1) “lending rate” is 
usually a weighted average of household and corporate lending rates, and 2) the foreign currency lending rate is the euro 
area lending rate, not a country specific effective FX lending rate. Despite these concerns, we regard this variable to be an 
acceptable proxy of the effective interest rate differential.
We took two approaches to deal with the households’ long-term exchange rate expectations. in the first approach we 
assumed that households view the exchange rate as a random walk process; their best guess of future exchange rate being 
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1 , was taken to be zero. As for a second solution, 
we used the consensus economics database and proxied the households’ exchange rate expectations by 12-month exchange 
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1  does not equal to zero, and hence we 
incorporated the expectations measure in our estimations as described later.
even  when  we  assumed  that  households’  expectation  of  long-term  depreciation  is  zero,  we  allowed  for  non-zero 
expectations of the variance (conditional variance) of the exchange rate and the short-term rate. The idea behind this 
asymmetric treatment is that even if households are unable to forecast precisely the long-term exchange rate, they might 
still have a view on its variance because they have a picture about the monetary authority’s tolerance to exchange rate 
fluctuations. They may also have learnt to what extent the central bank reacts to exchange rate movements by changing 
short-term interest rates. in other words, they are aware of the degree of “fear of float” that prevails in their country, even 
if they cannot forecast exchange rate trends. To capture households’ perception of “fear of float” in their country, we 
constructed a measure in Section 3, which is a difference between conditional variances of the interest rate and the 
exchange  rate.  We  assumed  that  conditional  variances  are  formed  based  on  observed  past  behaviour  of  monetary 
authorities.
The conditional variances of short-term interest rates, varti, are proxied by the variance of monthly short-term interest rates 
calculated on a two-year period covering t-1 and t. The variances are expressed in percentage points. The “money market 
interest rate” variable from the eurostat database was used for short term interest rates. 
The  conditional  variances  of  the  exchange  rate  depreciation,  vartDs,  were  constructed  the  same  way  as  interest  rate 
variances. Data for exchange rates vis-à-vis the euro/ecU were gathered from eurostat.
4 Asthisvariablefortheeuroareaisavailableonlyuntil2003M9,weassumedthatafterwardsitsdynamicsfollowsthatofthelendingrateofhouseholds’5-10year
loansforhousepurchasesandnewbusinesses.
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We assumed away the conditional variance in the foreign short rate (and consequently any covariance with home currency 
depreciation). This is because the bulk of our sample period was characterised by low and stable short-term euro rates and 
households probably did not regard a sudden increase in euro rate volatility as a potential threat. However, as we noted in 
Section ii, since the financial crisis and in particular since the lehman episode, households may have had learnt that FX 
lending rates may change quickly, as parent banks started to price in country risk in their internal funding costs for the 
subsidiaries. We just want to note here that any analysis of NMS households’ post-lehman borrowing behaviour should 
not omit FX interest rate variance and covariance with the exchange rate. 
As we argued in Section 3, the availability of fixed interest rate loans may be an important factor in households’ decision. 
However, we did not have comprehensive NMS data on the relative shares of fixed and variable interest rate loans. As a 
general observation, in countries with less developed financial systems variable rate mortgages are more prevalent.5 one 
usual obstacle to the provision of long-term fixed-rate loans is the lack of long-term fixed-rate funding. long-term funding 
in domestic currency is more available to the banking sector if a sizeable and well-functioning covered bond market exists 
in the country. Data on covered bond stocks and issuance in NMSs is more readily available from the european covered 
Bond council (ecBc). We have proxied the availability of fixed interest rate domestic currency loans by a dummy variable, 
which took the value of 1 if there was significant issuance of domestic currency covered bonds in the given year. More 
specifically, we regarded the dummy variable 1 for a given year and country if (1) the total covered bond stock was greater 
than 1 per cent of the domestic GDP, and (2) this stock was growing faster than GDP in the given year, and (3) the share 
of domestic currency denominated bonds in new covered bond issuance was larger than 50 percent.
The ecBc data suggests that there were only three NMS countries where there was a non-negligible issuance of domestic 
currency covered bonds: the czech republic from 2002 and Slovakia form 2003 continuously, and Hungary between 2002 
and 2004. in Hungary, this was obviously related to the generous mortgage subsidy scheme which was launched in 2001 
and was restricted at the end of 2003 after it proved to be fiscally unsustainable. issuance size after 2003 started to decline 
and the currency composition, which previously was almost entirely home currency, switched more and more towards FX. 
it is suggestive to see that households in these three countries (in Hungary up to 2003) have exhibited the lowest willingness 
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Chart	5
outstanding	stock	of	covered	bonds
Source: European Covered Bond Council.MAGYAr NeMZeTi BANK
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ESTIMATIoN	METHoD	AND	RESUlTS
The implication of our analytical framework presented in the Section 3 is that households’ willingness to borrow in foreign 
currency is a positive function of relative risk-adjusted returns on FX versus domestic currency loans. With the notation of 
Section 2 and 3:
) ( it it RRAR f FX = ,         ' f >0 
To test this implication we estimate panel regression models. Table 1 shows the least squares estimation results of the 
different specifications.
The left hand side variable (FXit), as defined in Section 2, is the share of the foreign currency denominated credit in the 
total credit flow in each year, dlrateit stands for the difference between domestic and foreign lending rates, fofit – which 
measures the degree of “fear of floating” – is defined as the difference between the conditional variance of the domestic 
money market rate and that of currency depreciation, cbondit is a dummy variable which indicates the availability of a well 
functioning covered bond market in the new member states (and, as such, proxies the availability of long-term fixed interest 
rate home currency loans) and expect_fxit stands for expected currency depreciation as defined in the previous section. 
each model is estimated using both cross-section and period fixed effects to control for heterogeneity among countries and 
possible common tendencies over time. Since our approach focuses primarily on the demand side of the credit markets, any 
potential heterogeneities stemming from the supply side will be captured by these fixed effects.
The first two columns in Table 1 contain the results of models estimated on the entire sample. While the signs of the 
coefficients of variables dlrateit and cbondit are supporting the findings of our analytical framework described in Section 
2, the parameters of the “fear of floating” and expected depreciation have the opposite sign to what our framework 
suggests regarding the relationship between share of the foreign currency denominated credit in the total credit flow and 
these two variables. Note also that the degree of “fear of floating” in the first model and the exchange rate expectations 
in the second are not significant at any usual significance levels.
in the next step we re-estimate the model excluding romania from the sample. The reason of doing so is that in the last 
10 years romania went through a macroeconomic adjustment and a disinflation process which was significantly different 
from the other countries, starting from very high initial inflation rates (an average of 45% in 1999) and interest rates (54-
c
0.316*** 0.325*** 0.300*** 0.303***
(0.061) (0.059) (0.047) (0.043)
dlrate
0.027** 0.027** 0.041*** 0.043***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
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–0.004 –0.005** 0.021*** 0.020***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006)
cbond
–0.323*** –0.336*** –0.324*** –0.343***




Adj.R2 0.711 0.715 0.766 0.772




  (dependent variable FXit)
Note: *, **, *** indicate variables significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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105 per cent in 1999), occasionally showing very strong currency depreciation (reaching 70 per cent in 1999). in such a 
fast-changing environment conditional interest rate and exchange rate variances, as we constructed them, are very hard to 
interpret. indeed finite variances may not exist even on the relatively short, two-year horizon on which we measured them. 
chart 6 illustrates the very different nominal path romania was following compared to the other NMSs, showing the 
money market rate differentials vis-à-vis euro rates of the countries in the sample.
The last two columns in Table 1 show the estimation results dropping romania from the sample. in these cases interest 
rate differentials, “fear of floating”, and dummy variable that indicates a well functioning covered bond market have 
significant effects with expected signs. large interest rate differentials and significant “fear of floating” increases the share 
of the foreign currency borrowing, while the presence of a well functioning domestic covered bond market decreases it to 
a large extent. one of our key findings is that the availability of a relatively large domestic covered bond market turned 
out to be significant in all cases and has a large negative effect on foreign currency lending. our results suggest that 
exchange rate expectations did not materially affect households’ decisions about the currency denomination of the credit. 
one reason for this latter finding may be a poor representation of households’ expectation by our proxy, which in essence 
is the average forecast of a small group of professional macro analysts. 
The standard errors in the parentheses are robust for possible heteroscedasticity in the data. Autocorrelation tests do not 
indicate significant autocorrelation in the residuals. The preference of fixed effects model over the random effects setting 
is confirmed by the Hausman test. The redundancy of period and cross-section fixed effects were tested with a likelihood 
ratio tests. in both cases the null of redundant period and cross-section fixed effects can be rejected at any significance 
level. 
Period fixed effects show an increasing trend (chart 7). one possible interpretation of this feature is that regional FX credit 
supply factors (for example business models/strategies of parent banks regarding the region, the availability of FX funding), 
not explicitly included in our analysis, are important drivers of foreign currency borrowing in NMSs, warranting further 
research in this area.
Finally, we turn to the issue of endogeneity. in our empirical model two main sources of endogeneity can be identified. 
First, since we are trying to identify the effect of the lending rate differential on the share of FX loans in the total flow of 
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Chart	6
Interest	rates	differentials	in	NMSs*
* Percentage point differences vis-à-vis euro money market rates.MAGYAr NeMZeTi BANK
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of foreign currency loans are simultaneously determined according to the supply and demand for loans. This simultaneity 
is also reflected in the share of FX loans in and the interest rate differential. 
Second, there is another source bias stemming from the simultaneity between high foreign currency exposures, the risks 
associated with this kind of imbalances and their effect on domestic interest rates. High FX exposure of the households’ 
balance sheet, and thus increased vulnerability of the banking system and/or the state may lead to higher domestic interest 
rates, which in turn raises the domestic-foreign interest rate spread and may lead to even higher levels of FX-lending.
To overcome the first source of endogeneity we instrumented the lending rate differential with its lagged values. We used 
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Chart	7
Period	fixed	effects
Note: Fixed effects shown here are from the third model in Table 1, the others show a similar pattern.
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–0.009*** –0.009*** 0.034*** 0.034***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009)
cbond
–0.363*** –0.398*** –0.361*** –0.363***








  (dependent variable FXit)
Note: *, **, *** indicate variables significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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to correlate with the error of the regression. The lagged interest rate differentials can be regarded as predetermined 
variables in this context. The results of the two stage least squares estimation, using the first and second lags of the interest 
rate differential as instruments, are summarized in Table 2.
As in the previous case, the estimation results are more significant and the signs of the parameters are more intuitive if we 
exclude romania from the sample. in general, the coefficients of the interest rate differentials estimated via 2SlS are 
somewhat higher than those of estimated using ordinary least squares suggesting that the interest rate differentials may 
play a more important role in foreign currency borrowing than it could be inferred from the original models. Again, the 
null hypothesis that exchange rate expectations – captured by the consensus forecasts – do not have a significant effect on 
the denomination structure of household debt cannot be rejected at any usual significance levels.
in order to assess whether the second channel of potential endogeneity (high FX-borrowing → high risks → high domestic 
interest rates) is relevant in our sample we estimated a panel regression model. We used sovereign credit default swap (cDS) 
spreads  as  a  proxy  for  a  country’s  risk  premium  and  households’  FX  credit  stock  relative  to  GDP  as  a  measure  of 
FX-exposure. our results (see Table 3) show that after including period and cross-section fixed effects, the parameter of 
the FX-to-GDP variable is not significant on the 5 % level, however, it is significant on 10 % level. These results are, 
however, driven mainly by the data of 2008, i.e. the first year of the crisis. if we estimate the model on the pre-crisis 
2003–2007 period (no cDS data are available before 2003), the parameter of the FX-to-GDP becomes insignificant on any 
conventional confidence level. As the main stock of FX-credit was built up before 2008, the insignificant parameter of the 











  (dependent variable: sovereign CDS spreads)
Note: *, **, *** indicate variables significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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in this paper we tried to explain differences in household foreign currency borrowing in NMSs focusing on the credit 
demand side. We set up a simple analytical framework based on relative risk-adjusted returns on FX versus domestic 
currency loans. The framework identified some demand side explanatory variables that appeared in other empirical papers, 
such as the interest rate differential and exchange rate volatility. Beyond these, even in this simple framework we were able 
to show that institutional features of bank lending, such as the prevalence of variable versus fixed rate loans may be an 
important factor influencing households’ choice. The prevalence of variable rate loans implies that what matters is not only 
exchange rate volatility in itself but its relative size to domestic interest rate volatility, i.e. the “fear of floating”.
We briefly discuss that beside risk-return considerations, households’ liquidity constraints may magnify the effect of 
interest rate differentials, “fear of floating” and the lack of fixed interest rate domestic currency loans on households’ 
choice between FX and home currency loans.
We test the implications of our analytical framework with a panel estimation on a data set covering ten NMSs. our 
dependent variable is a proxy for the share of new FX loans in total new loans, which is able to capture changes in 
households’ choice more promptly than the share of FX loans in the total stock, the preferred dependent variable in other 
empirical studies. Just like the other studies, we found the interest rate differential to be a significant explanatory variable. 
The availability of fixed interest rate domestic currency loans, proxied by the existence of sizeable local covered bond 
markets is also very significant and has a large negative effect on household foreign currency borrowing. The performance 
of our “fear of floating” variable is somewhat less convincing, although it is strongly significant and assumes the right sign 
in a specifications which exclude romania, a country which followed a nominal path very different to the rest of the NMSs 
in a large part of our sample period. our results also suggest that there may be some role for supply-side factors in 
explaining FX borrowing in NMSs, something that other papers have already demonstrated. 
There are some policy implications that emerge from our analysis. First, in an environment where foreign currency loans 
are increasingly available, monetary policy should aim at quick disinflation, which will help reduce the interest rate 
differential. Secondly, a strong and prolonged “fear of floating” behaviour of the monetary authority may induce the 
unwarranted build-up of currency mismatches. Thirdly, increasing the availability of long-term fixed-interest rate loans 
(e.g. through the fiscally sustainable promotion of local covered bond markets) may make home currency borrowing more 
attractive for households.
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